000			03789cam a2200325 a 4500
001			15724689
003			ARRUPE
005			20211027095952.0
008			090505s2010 enk b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2009018683
020			_a9780415552981 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a0415552982 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a9780415552967 (hardback : alk. paper)
020			_a0415552966 (hardback : alk. paper)
035			_a(OCoLC)ocn320953959
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dYDX _dYDXCP _dHEBIS _dDLC
050	0	0	_aBD161 _b.P749 2010
082	0	0	_a121 _222
100	1		_aPritchard, Duncan. _938215
245	1	0	_aWhat is this thing called knowledge? / _cDuncan Pritchard.
250			_a2nd ed.
260			_aLondon ; _aNew York : _bRoutledge, _c2010.
300			_aix,185 p. ; _c26 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aWhat is knowledge? -- Some preliminaries -- Types of knowledge -- Two basic requirements on knowledge : truth and belief -- Knowing versus merely getting it right -- A brief remark on truth -- The value of knowledge -- Why care about knowledge? -- The instrumental value of true belief -- The value of knowledge -- The statues of Daedalus -- Is some knowledge intrinsically valuable? -- Defining knowledge -- The problem of the criterion -- Methodism and particularism -- Knowledge as justifed true belief -- Gettier cases -- Responding to the gettier cases -- Back to the problem of the criterion -- The structure of knowledge -- Knowledge and justification -- The enigmatic nature of justification -- Agrippa's trilemma -- Infinitism -- Coherentism -- Foundationalism -- Rationality -- Rationality, justification, and knowledge -- Epistemic rationality and the goal of truth -- The goal(s) of epistemic rationality -- The (un)importance of epistemic rationality -- Rationality and responsibility -- Epistemic internalism/externalism -- Virtues and faculties -- Reliabilism -- A gettier problem for reliabilism -- Virtue epistemology -- Virtue epistemology and the externalism/internalism distinction -- Where does knowledge come from? -- Perception -- The problem of perceptual knowledge -- Indirect realism -- Idealism -- Transcendental idealism -- Direct realism -- Testimony and memory -- The problem of testimonial knowledge -- Reductionism -- Credulism -- The problem of memorial knowledge -- A priority and inference -- A priori and empirical knowledge -- The interdependence of A priori and empirical knowledge -- Introspective knowledge -- Deduction -- Induction -- Abduction -- The problem of induction -- The problem of induction -- Responding to the problem of induction -- Living with the problem of induction I : falsification -- Living with the problem of induction II : pragmatism -- A case study : moral knowledge -- The problem of moral knowledge -- Scepticism about moral facts -- Scepticism about moral knowledge -- The nature of moral knowledge (I) : classical foundationalism -- The nature of moral knowledge (II) : alternative conceptions -- Do we know anything at all? -- Scepticism about other minds -- The problem of other minds -- The argument from analogy -- A problem for the argument from analogy -- Two versions of the problem of other minds -- Perceiving someone else's mind -- Radical scepticism -- The radical sceptical paradox -- Scepticism and closure -- Mooreanism -- Contextualism -- Truth and objectivity -- Objectivity, anti-realism, and scepticism -- Truth as the goal of inquiry -- Authenticity and the value of truth -- Relativism.
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of.
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2lcc _cMONOGRAPH
999			_c130984 _d130984