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008			101025t20112011enk b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2010045715
020			_a9781107003231
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda _dDLC
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aBD331 _b.E43 2011
082	0	0	_a111 _222
084			_aPHI004000 _2bisacsh
100	1		_aElder, Crawford L., _d1949- _99843
245	1	0	_aFamiliar Objects and their Shadows / _cby Crawford L. Elder.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cc2011.
300			_axi, 210 p. ; _c23 cm.
490	0		_aCambridge Studies in Philosophy
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 195-199) and index.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Two false friends of an ontology of familiar objects; 2. Conventionalism as ontological relativism; 3. Realism about material objects: persistence, persistence conditions, and natural kinds; 4. Ontological preference for the temporally small; 5. Ontological preference for microphysical causes; 6. Ontological preference for the spatially small; 7. A third false friend of familiar objects: universal mereological composition; 8. Concluding Hegelian postscript; Appendix: 'mutually interfering' dimensions of difference; Reference.
520			_a"Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles 'dog-wise arranged' explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to 'explain away' familiar objects project downwards, onto the tiny entities, structures and features of familiar objects themselves. He contends that sceptical metaphysicians are thus employing shadows of familiar objects, while denying that the entities which cast those shadows really exist. He argues that the shadows are indeed really there, because their sources - familiar objects - are mind-independently real"--
650		0	_aReality. _99844
650		0	_aPhenomenalism. _99845
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of. _99846
650		0	_aMetaphysics. _99847
650		0	_aOntology. _99848
650		7	_aPHILOSOPHY / Epistemology _2bisacsh. _99849
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/03231/cover/9781107003231.jpg
856	4	2	_3Publisher description _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1101/2010045715-d.html
856	4	1	_3Table of contents only _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1101/2010045715-t.html
856	4	2	_3Contributor biographical information _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1101/2010045715-b.html
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942			_2lcc _cMONOGRAPH
999			_c120401 _d120401