000			03872fam a2200433 a 4500
001			2095988
003			ARRUPE
005			20140225020012.0
008			970508s1998 nju b 001 0 eng
010			_a 97015848
020			_a0691043485 (alk. paper)
020			_a0691074518 (pbk.)
035			_a(OCoLC)36922746
035			_a(OCoLC)ocm36922746
035			_a(NNC)2095988
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dNNC _dOrLoB-B
041	1		_aeng _hfre
050	0	0	_aB2779 _b.L6613 1997
100	1		_aLonguenesse, Béatrice, _d1950- _98678
240	1	0	_aKant et le pouvoir de juger. _lEnglish
245	1	0	_aKant and the capacity to judge : _bsensibility and discursivity in the transcendental analytic of the Critique of pure reason / _cBéatrice Longuenesse.
260			_aPrinceton, NJ : _bPrinceton University Press, _cc1998.
263			_a9712
300			_axv, 420 p. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [401]-407) and indexes.
505	0	0	_gCh. 1. _tSynthesis and Judgment -- _gCh. 2. _tThe "Threefold Synthesis" and the Mathematical Model -- _gCh. 3. _tThe Transition to Judgment -- _gCh. 4. _tLogical Definitions of Judgment -- _gCh. 5. _tHow Discursive Understanding Comes to the Sensible Given: Comparison of Representations and Judgment -- _gCh. 6. _tConcepts of Comparison, Forms of Judgment, Concept Formation -- _gCh. 7. _tJudgments of Perception and Judgments of Experience -- _gCh. 8. _tSynthesis Speciosa and Forms of Sensibility -- _gCh. 9. _tThe Primacy of Quantitative Syntheses -- _gCh. 10. _tThe Real as Appearance: Imagination and Sensation -- _gCh. 11. _tThe Constitution of Experience -- _tConclusion: The Capacity to Judge and "Ontology as Immanent Thinking"
520			_aKant claims to have established his table of categories or "pure concepts of the understanding" according to the "guiding thread" provided by logical forms of judgment. By drawing extensively on Kant's logical writings, Beatrice Longuenesse analyzes this controversial claim, and then follows the thread through its continuation in the transcendental deduction of the categories, the transcendental schemata, and the principles of pure understanding.
520	8		_aThe result is a systematic, persuasive new interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason.
520	8		_aLonguenesse shows that although Kant adopts his inventory of the forms of judgment from logic textbooks of his time, he is nevertheless original in selecting just those forms he holds to be indispensable to our ability to relate representations to objects. Kant gives formal representation to this relation between conceptual thought and its objects by introducing the term "x" into his analysis of logical forms to stand for the object that is "thought under" the concepts that are combined in judgment.
520	8		_aThis "x" plays no role in Kant's forms of logical inference, but instead plays a role in clarifying the relation between logical forms (forms of concept subordination) and combinations ("syntheses") of perceptual data, necessary for empirical cognition.
520	8		_aConsidering Kant's logical forms of judgment thus helps illuminate crucial aspects of the Transcendental Analytic as a whole, while revealing the systematic unity between Kant's theory of judgment in the first Critique and his analysis of "merely reflective" (aesthetic and teleological) judgments in the third Critique. Longuenesse opens new avenues for investigating the relation between logic, psychology, and metaphysics in Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy.
600	1	0	_aKant, Immanuel, _d1724-1804 _xContributions in doctrine of judgment. _98679
600	1	0	_aKant, Immanuel, _d1724-1804. _tKritik der reinen Vernunft. _98680
650		0	_aJudgment. _98681
900			_bTOC
942			_2lcc _cMONOGRAPH _01
948	2		_a20070110 _ba _crad1 _dMPS
948	2		_a20070110 _ba _crad1 _dMPS
999			_c120065 _d120065