000 03430mam a2200349 a 4500
001 1726040
003 ARRUPE
005 20130924183626.0
008 960119s1995 onc b 001 0 eng d
020 _a0802029736
020 _a0802037747 (pbk.)
035 _a(OCoLC)ocm34057082
035 _a(NNC)1726040
040 _aUCW
_cUCW
_dNNC
_dOrLoB
100 1 _aFalkenstein, Lorne.
_91170
245 1 0 _aKant's intuitionism :
_ba commentary on the transcendental aesthetic /
_cLorne Falkenstein.
260 _aToronto ;
_aBuffalo :
_bUniversity of Toronto Press,
_cc1995.
300 _axxiii, 465 p. ;
_c24 cm.
490 1 _aToronto studies in philosophy
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
505 0 0 _tIntroduction.
_gi.
_tNativism and Empirism.
_gii.
_tIntuitionism and Constructivism.
_giii.
_tFormal Intuitionism.
_giv.
_tKant's Formal Intuitionism.
_gv.
_tGrounds for the Popular Neglect of Formal Intuitionism --
_gPt. I.
_tKant's Representation Terminology.
_g1.
_tThe Distinction between Intuition and Understanding.
_gi.
_tThe Sense/Intellect Distinction in ID.
_gii.
_tThe Argument of ID.
_giii.
_tStrategic Difficulties.
_giv.
_tThe Distinction between the Faculties in the Critique.
_gv.
_tThe Circularity Problem.
_gvi.
_tRegressive Terminology.
_g2.
_tThe Distinction between Form and Matter of Intuition.
_gi.
_tThe Two Basic Features of an Intuitive Representation.
_gii.
_tTextual Evidence against Forms as Mechanisms.
_giii.
_tTextual Evidence against Forms as Representations.
_giv.
_tConflicting Passages.
_g3.
_tSensation and the Matter of Intuition.
_gi.
_tThe Epistemological Role of Sensation.
_gii.
_tThe Ontological Status of Sensation.
_g4.
_tOrigins of the Form and the Matter of Intuition --
_gPt. II.
_tThe Expositions.
505 8 0 _g5.
_tThe First Exposition.
_gi.
_tKant's Objectives in the First Exposition.
_gii.
_tKant's Sensationist Opposition.
_giii.
_tThe Standard Objection to the First Exposition.
_giv.
_tThe Grounds of Kant's Rejection of Sensationism.
_g6.
_tThe Second Exposition.
_gi.
_tAnalysis of the Argument.
_gii.
_tThe Inextricability Argument.
_giii.
_tThe Third Exposition in A and the Validity of Geometry.
_giv.
_tThe Independence Argument.
_g7.
_tThe Later Expositions.
_gi.
_tThe Singularity Argument.
_gii.
_tThe Whole/Part Priority Argument.
_giii.
_tThe Infinity Argument.
_giv.
_tThe Completeness of the Later Expositions.
_gv.
_tThe Composition of Intelligible Spaces and Times.
_g8.
_tThe Transcendental Expositions.
_gi.
_tThe Buttressing Argument.
_gii.
_tThe Subjectivity Argument.
_giii.
_tThe Explanation of the Possibility of Geometry and Mechanics --
_gPt. III.
_tConclusions from the Above Concepts.
_g9.
_tKant's Argument for the Non-spatiotemporality of Things in Themselves.
_gi.
_tSubstantival Space and Time.
_gii.
_tRelative Space and Time.
505 8 0 _giii.
_tLimits of Kant's Result.
_g10.
_tThe Unknowability Thesis and the Problem of Affection.
_gi.
_tUnknowability.
_gii.
_tAffection.
_g11.
_tKant, Mendelssohn, Lambert, and the Subjectivity of Time.
_gi.
_tKant's Subjectivity Thesis.
_gii.
_tMendelssohn's Objection.
_giii.
_tKant's Response to Mendelssohn and the Subjectivity Thesis.
600 1 0 _aKant, Immanuel,
_d1724-1804.
_tKritik der reinen Vernunft.
_91171
650 0 _aIntuition.
_91172
650 0 _aTranscendentalism.
_91173
650 0 _aAesthetics.
_91174
830 0 _aToronto studies in philosophy.
_91175
900 _bTOC
942 _2lcc
_cMONOGRAPH
948 1 _a20070118
_bc
_crad1
_dMPS
999 _c118021
_d118021