Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Introduction. i. Nativism and Empirism. ii. Intuitionism and Constructivism. iii. Formal Intuitionism. iv. Kant's Formal Intuitionism. v. Grounds for the Popular Neglect of Formal Intuitionism -- Pt. I. Kant's Representation Terminology. 1. The Distinction between Intuition and Understanding. i. The Sense/Intellect Distinction in ID. ii. The Argument of ID. iii. Strategic Difficulties. iv. The Distinction between the Faculties in the Critique. v. The Circularity Problem. vi. Regressive Terminology. 2. The Distinction between Form and Matter of Intuition. i. The Two Basic Features of an Intuitive Representation. ii. Textual Evidence against Forms as Mechanisms. iii. Textual Evidence against Forms as Representations. iv. Conflicting Passages. 3. Sensation and the Matter of Intuition. i. The Epistemological Role of Sensation. ii. The Ontological Status of Sensation. 4. Origins of the Form and the Matter of Intuition -- Pt. II. The Expositions.

5. The First Exposition. i. Kant's Objectives in the First Exposition. ii. Kant's Sensationist Opposition. iii. The Standard Objection to the First Exposition. iv. The Grounds of Kant's Rejection of Sensationism. 6. The Second Exposition. i. Analysis of the Argument. ii. The Inextricability Argument. iii. The Third Exposition in A and the Validity of Geometry. iv. The Independence Argument. 7. The Later Expositions. i. The Singularity Argument. ii. The Whole/Part Priority Argument. iii. The Infinity Argument. iv. The Completeness of the Later Expositions. v. The Composition of Intelligible Spaces and Times. 8. The Transcendental Expositions. i. The Buttressing Argument. ii. The Subjectivity Argument. iii. The Explanation of the Possibility of Geometry and Mechanics -- Pt. III. Conclusions from the Above Concepts. 9. Kant's Argument for the Non-spatiotemporality of Things in Themselves. i. Substantival Space and Time. ii. Relative Space and Time.

iii. Limits of Kant's Result. 10. The Unknowability Thesis and the Problem of Affection. i. Unknowability. ii. Affection. 11. Kant, Mendelssohn, Lambert, and the Subjectivity of Time. i. Kant's Subjectivity Thesis. ii. Mendelssohn's Objection. iii. Kant's Response to Mendelssohn and the Subjectivity Thesis.