Game theory / Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir ; translated from Hebrew by Ziv Hellman ; English editor, Mike Borns.
Material type:
TextPublisher number: ArrupeLanguage: English Original language: Hebrew Description: xxvi, 979 pages ; 26 cmISBN: - 9781107005488 (hardback)
- Torat ha-miśḥaḳim. English
- 519.3 23
- QA269 .Z3613 2013
- BUS069000
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ARRUPE LIBRARY Main Collection | QA269 .Z3613 2013 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 46700000119 |
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| QA266.S28 A concrete approach to abstract algebra. | QA267.3 .H37 Introduction to formal language theory / | QA267.5.C45 W67 2001 A new kind of science / | QA269 .Z3613 2013 Game theory / | QA273 .C26 Logical foundations of probability. | QA273 .H22 The emergence of probability : a philosophical study of early ideas about probability, induction and statistical inference / | QA273.25 .L57 2000 Schaum's outline of theory and problems of probability / |
Translation of: Torat ha-miśḥaḳim / Shemuʼel Zamir, Mikhaʼel Mashler ṿe-Elon Solan.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 958-967) and index.
Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Bargaining games; 16. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 17. The core; 18. The Shapley value; 19. The bargaining set; 20. The nucleolus; 21. Social choice; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices; Index.
"Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers"--
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